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INTRODUCTION

In retrospect, the journey I embarked on three years ago culminating in this research
and the exhibition that it explicates, directed me to an understanding I had not set out
to find. This journey drove me, perhaps by inner necessity, to seek something at or
beyond the limits of our specific ideas about truth, our reality and our gods. This
journey led me to the borders between the oppositions of here and there, virtue and
vice, self and other, a place where darkness shines in the light and light within the
dark. In time I realized that perhaps, ‘what was said of God not yet suffices me’, that
perhaps ‘it is the beyond divinity that is my light and my life’ (Angelous Selesius in
Derrida 1993:65).

Initially, my journey started as a need to develop a personal style of painting. During
my theoretical and practical explorations, I became particularly interested in the field
of metaphysics, specifically in relation to the current developments of metaphysical
expression in contemporary art practice. It was then that I decided to investigate how
contemporary forms of metaphysical imaging have evolved formally and stylistically.
I began to question how such approaches might be informed by current philosophical
thought, given that many contemporary theorists have adopted a sceptical view
towards metaphysical discourse. This point of contention presented me with the initial
challenge of finding an artist whose exploration of metaphysical content is supported
by topical philosophical thought. I intended this inquiry to serve as a basis from which
to develop my own approach to imaging metaphysical content and to situate it within
the context of contemporary thought.

In investigating such contemporary views, it became clear that many artists do in fact
continue to image metaphysical content even though the notion of a metaphysical
reality is not widely accepted in the context of current poststructural and linguistic
thought. One particular artist, Anselm Kiefer (1945 -) caught my attention, an artist
who uses imagery that may be said to hint at or allude to a deeper underlying reality.
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This is reflected in his choice of subject matter which displays a variety of sources
including visual references to Northern European myths, Western esoteric traditions
and overt Christian subject matter. These images are inherently symbolic in nature,
alluding to ‘historical and mythical events [that] are signposts, presenting information
about the nature of the world’ (Rosenthal 1987: 10).

What I found of particular interest was that Kiefer’s imagery reflects the use of
contemporary stylistic devices such as intertextuality. This concept, coined by the
feminist author Julia Kristeva, pertains to a combination of imagery from various
contexts such as realism and abstraction, and is informed by the poststructural
philosophy of Jacques Derrida. In familiarizing myself with this concept, I was
intrigued to discover that an intertextual approach to imaging may undermine the
expression of definitive ideas, rendering the content of such images indeterminate.

These images are indeterminate because they are combined in such a way as to
suggest contradictory interpretations of a concept. Rosenthal’s analyses of Kiefer’s
work also suggests that the content of his images is indeterminate, because it ‘always
mingles viewpoints and represents conflicting interpretations’ (1998: 155).

I found it contradictory, even nonsensical that imagery which aims to suggest
metaphysical content may also be informed by a philosophical theory that denies and
debases the signification of any specific idea. The idea of metaphysical images
informed by poststructural theory which claims that all our notions of reality and truth
are dependent on, and limited to language, and that, ‘there is no deeper subjective
reality underlying the ordinary, socially created self, and no deeper reality underlying
the ordinary socially created intelligibility of the world’ (Harland 1987: 68) seemed
even more perplexing.

It was this contradiction that presented me with the main problem for this research. I
was intent on solving these contradictions and hoped that in the process I would
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discover exactly if and how Kiefer’s intertextual images might express metaphysical
content. I also hoped that such an investigation might provide me with the necessary
impetus and information to develop in my studio work, an approach to imaging the
metaphysical within the framework of poststructural thought and intertextual
practices.

I realized that it might be possible to resolve these contradictions, by proving either
that Kiefer’s images still express metaphysical content symbolically, or that they
allude to metaphysical content that is informed by intertextuality. This contention
presented me with the sub problems of my research. I wanted to determine firstly,
whether the metaphysical content of Kiefer's work was specific to its symbolic
properties and secondly, whether the metaphysical content was specific to its
intertextual properties. The method I have adopted to found my argument is, firstly, to
compare Kiefer’s intertextual imagery and its content with the principles of
metaphysical symbolism, and secondly, to compare these images to the principles of
intertextuality and the poststructural thought that informs it. Furthermore, I hoped that
the analyses of these images might elucidate how the symbolic and intertextual
elements of these images interrelate and how this informs their metaphysical content.

Since my work is informed by a similar contradiction between symbolic and
intertextual stylistic practices, I will apply the same analytical principles to selected
images from my own work. This will serve as a useful theoretical basis that may both
inform my studio work and validate the contentions and premises of this research.

In Chapter I, the definition and aims of metaphysical discourse will be outlined in
general terms. This will serve as a background to the research. The notion of
metaphysical imaging, that is, the visual expression of metaphysical content, will be
investigated in relation to the theory of metaphysical symbolism as defined by
William Urban.  Urban, a former professor of philosophy at the University of Harvard
during the first half of the 20th century, developed a general theory of symbolism, in
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which he outlined the major characteristics and functions of metaphysical symbols.
Urban was aware at the time that modernist philosophy (such as logical positivism
and structuralism) aimed ‘to eliminate metaphysics, and to reduce it to the level of the
unmeaning’ (1939: 15). He developed his theories as a means to prove that symbolic
discourse may still serve as a valid means of expressing the metaphysical.

Even though Urban’s views are regarded in general as obscure and of little
contemporary relevance, his theories do provide clear criteria for the recognition and
general characterization of metaphysical symbols. As a general theory of symbolism,
these notions will serve as a useful theoretical guide from which to ascertain if and
how Kiefer’s images may be said to express metaphysical concept in symbolic form.
Since my own images are also informed by varied symbolic and esoteric systems,
Urban’s theories will also be applied to my own work to formally characterize their
symbolic content.  

The second section of the chapter focuses on an investigation of the intertextual
qualities inherent in Kiefer’s images. Firstly, this inquiry will aim to elucidate the
attributes of intertextuality as defined by Kristeva, specifically the indeterminate
qualities of such imagery, and to demonstrate how this is informed by aspects of
poststructural thought. Secondly, this investigation will aim to indicate how these
indeterminate qualities of intertextual images may be consistent or inconsistent with
the general principles of metaphysical symbols as defined by Urban. The investigation
will also serve as a useful theoretical basis that will inform a stylistic analysis in
Chapter II. 

In Chapter II, I demonstrate and investigate, with reference to selected images of the
work of Kiefer as well as my own, the nature of the relationship between the
intertextual and the symbolic. The aim here is to define in visual terms any
consistencies or inconsistencies between the intertextual use of imagery and
metaphysical symbolism. As a basis for this inquiry, the images will be stylistically
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analysed with reference to Urban’s theories in order to determine whether these
images reflect attributes of traditional metaphysical symbols, such as negation,
anthropomorphism and generalization. 

I also demonstrate whether these attributes, if indeed present in these intertextual
images, are consistent with the principles of metaphysical symbolism. The intertextual
elements in these works will also be stylistically analysed with reference to
poststructural principles. The intention here is to determine in greater detail how
intertextuality contributes to the conceptual indeterminacy of these images, and how
this may impede or facilitate an expression of symbolic content.

In Chapter III, after having defined the nature of the relation between the intertextual
and the symbolic properties of these images, I aim to establish the specific nature of
the indeterminate content of these images. This will be done with reference to certain
principles of post structuralism. This investigation will determine whether the content
of these images is consistent with Urban’s view of the metaphoric and the symbolic.
The aim here is to assess whether these intertextual images may still be regarded as
being metaphoric and symbolic.

In the second part of the chapter, the possibility that the indeterminate content of
intertextual images may allude to the metaphysical will be explored. The specific
nature of any such metaphysical content will also be investigated in this section. In
addition, the investigation will also determine whether there is any relationship
between poststructural principles and traditional philosophical and religious views of
the metaphysical.

In the conclusion, I present the basic results of this research and comment on the
contemporary relevance of intertextual images as a vehicle for metaphysical content.
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The relevance of this field of research is affirmed by the renewed emphasis, many
contemporary critics such as Suzi Gablik place on the notion of the metaphysical. She
contends for example, that the excessively fragmented, deconstructive and highly
rationalistic viewpoint adopted by contemporary culture is leading to a destructive
condition that fosters isolation as well as a lack of values and meaning. As she says,
‘in the last analysis, the psychological roots of the crisis humanity is facing on a
global scale seem to lie in the loss of the spiritual perspective. Since a harmonious
experience of life requires, amongst other things the fulfilment of transcendental
needs, a culture that has denied spirituality…is doomed to failure in all other avenues
of its activities’ (Gablik. 58)

In a broader perspective, it seems that metaphysical discourse is still a relevant and
needed form of discourse in contemporary culture and that its continued exploration
in the field of art, may serve as a means to restore a sense of interconnectedness and
purpose on a personal and social level. 

The reader must keep in mind, that the theoretical models used as a basis for this
research are not specifically related to visual art. Therefore I have had to interpret and
translate certain philosophical and literary concepts in visual terms. Furthermore,
since this  research will focus on delimited notions of metaphysical symbolism, any
correlation that may or may not be suggested between metaphysical symbolism and
the notion of intertextuality will be limited to the context of Urban’s theories and his
immediate philosophical influences.

Finally, since a limited number of artists are used as historical models for this
research, any conclusion (s) that may be reached, may only be valid in relation to
these artists work.
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CHAPTER I
IMAGING THE METAPHYSICAL

1.1.  METAPHYSICS  AND  METAPHYSICAL  SYMBOLISM

What lies behind everything that is? What is the meaning of life? These are some of
the questions usually associated with the notion of metaphysics. Although answers to
these questions have been subject to continual reassessment within the framework of
varying ideological perspectives, they all have one thing in common - they have been
and remain speculative, ‘because it is relatively impossible [sic]  to either confirm or
refute them empirically’ (Jordaan 1990: 813).

Although many theorists, artists and philosophers have expressed varied viewpoints
on this subject, many seem to agree that metaphysics includes a universal striving in
mankind to explain our existence. In his capacity as a psychologist, Fromm, even
went so far as to claim that ‘All passions and strivings of man are an attempt to find
an answer to his existence....the finest as well as the most barbaric cultures have the
same function - the difference is only whether the answer given is better or worse...’
(Jordaan 1990: 813).

In philosophical terms, metaphysics is usually associated with a study of the nature of
an ultimate reality, as well as descriptions and classifications that may reveal the most
general aspects of our objective reality. Such a view holds that these universal traits
may help situate our existence in the whole scheme of things, revealing meaningful
aspects of our being.

In popular usage this term is usually related to matters that concern the otherworldly
or spirituality, but traditionally metaphysics applies to all reality (the phenomenal and
the noumenal) and is distinguished from other forms of inquiry only by its notions of
generality (universality).
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The theories of Urban support the view that metaphysics is a valuable form of
discourse that may help to shed light on aspects of our reality and imbue our
experiences and existence with meaning and purpose. For Urban, metaphysical
discourse gives form to these ideas, through an intuitive exploration of abstract
constructs which underlie our immediate world of objective reality. As Urban
maintains, ‘The first characteristic of metaphysics, is that it makes assertions or
propositions about metempirical entities, which themselves are not directly
experienced, but are in some fashion, the coimplicates of experience’ (1939: 632). By
'metempirical coimplicates’ he means propositions of things that are beyond our
experience, the essence of things, or notions of the absolute. Urban maintains that
these assertions about metempirical entities help situate our experience within the
framework of a larger, meaningful whole, and that we cannot understand or
communicate important concepts related to our experience of our reality without
them. In a way, then, the insights gained through such ideas are coimplicates of
experience; they inform our understanding of ourselves and our world.

However, because these abstract metaphysical concepts allude to something that does
not form part of our objective reality, we cannot empirically verify the existence of
such entities. As a result,  ‘all statements [or images]  about these implicates are
symbolic in character’ rather than literal  descriptions  (Urban 1939: 635). Urban also
maintains that, although these symbolic images are intended to reflect abstract
content, they should nevertheless be based on aspects of our objective reality. This
follows from two principles:
The first is that metaphysical constructs transcend our reality, and as such are wholly
abstract incommunicable intuitive ideas. The only way we can express or
communicate such abstract ideas meaningfully is via the phenomenal, by means of a
relation to what we already know and understand (our objective reality).
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Secondly, traditional metaphysical belief has always held that ‘the phenomenal world
is an expression of a noumenal or intelligible world and that because of this relation,
the phenomenal may be taken to represent or stand as symbol for the noumenal’
(Urban 1939: 450). Urban claims that  ‘It has always been the contention of
traditional metaphysics that the finite presupposes the infinite, the relative the
absolute’ (1939:636).

Accordingly, the basis of Urban’s conception of metaphysical symbolism pertains to
the establishment of a relationship between an image and an abstract metaphysical
concept,  so that such images may not only refer to their own objective reality but also
to a metaphysical reality. As Urban contends, the nature of symbols ‘implies that it
shall not be the literal thing in itself, but rather have reference beyond itself’ (422:
1939).

As such, symbolic content may also be categorized as metaphoric, an operation
whereby meaning is transferred from one object or concept to another, through an
analogous relationship. For Urban such analogies constitute a necessary vehicle for
the expression of metaphysical ideas, that ‘could not be determined and expressed
except by such a transfer’ (1939: 179).

Symbolism thus reflects an inherent synthesis between the real and the ideal, the
phenomenal and the metaphysical concept. As Urban indicates, a symbol cannot serve
its function if one of these dialectical opposites is absent, ‘if either reference is taken
exclusively it becomes unreal or else a mere substituted sign’ (1939: 425). Indeed,
this inherent duality of symbols may be said to reflect a certain level of ambiguity in
that it articulates both abstract and literal aspects. However, even though this dual
identity of symbols presents a logical contradiction, Urban maintains that it is a valid
vehicle for the expression of metaphysical content because a conceptual interpretation
of symbols ultimately favours the signified (metaphysical content) as the true locus of
meaning. Urban says that   ‘This is the affirmative element in all symbol formation and
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expresses itself as the first principle of symbolism...namely that every symbol stands
for some object and the interpretation of the symbol is the determination of that
object’ (1939: 426).

We cannot, therefore, read the symbol backwards and interpret the signified (the
metaphysical) as a phenomenal thing. This would emphasize the literal aspect of the
symbol, which, contrary to its intended aim, would result in mere fiction or nonsense,
negating the symbol’s metaphysical content. As Urban states, ‘When the similarity
between symbol and symbolized is interpreted as though it was a picture [a
phenomenal thing], it is taken literally and always involves an element of fiction, it is
only when the similarity is taken by way of reflection [from signifier to signified] that
we have symbolic truth’ (1939: 440). Urban further maintains that symbolic truth ‘is
not the common [Literal] form of representation ...but a similarity in the way of
reflecting on the two things’ (1939: 409).

Symbolic truth for Urban however, is not limited to partial coincidences, characters
and relations, but rather constitutes a vehicle or medium of insight, ‘a gateway into
something beyond’ (1939: 416). This is supported by the author’s belief that symbols
do not merely represent or illustrate preconceived concepts, such as the absolute, but
also facilitate an  intuitive insight into the nature of the metaphysical.

Indeed, since knowledge of the metaphysical cannot be obtained through direct
experience and objective verification, Urban regards intuition as an invaluable
component of symbolic thought in that it allows us to understand the metaphysical
indirectly.

Urban maintains that this intuitive form of truth which can itself be neither presented
nor represented, is indirect because it  is  ‘made known ..in the very process of
discourse..’ (1939: 669). As he points out, ‘intuitive meaning .... comes out most
clearly when, through the mobility of words, [it is]  transferred metaphorically from
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one object or referred to another’ (1939: 156). Because such intuitive knowledge ‘is
immediately known in the process of experience’ (Urban 1939: 637), its disclosure
has the quality of a distinct and palpable impression.   

Since this form of knowledge is dependent on a relationship between opposing
elements such as the objective and abstract, image and idea, it may be regarded as a
dialectical process which through a synthesis, eventuates in a third concept. Urban
concludes that, ‘A recognition...of this third way of knowing opens up the possibility
of both understanding metaphysical language and of validating the type of
propositions expressed in this language’ (1939: 365).

Urban goes on to make a clear distinction between general symbolism and
metaphysical symbolism, claiming that metaphysical symbols are specifically
employed to ‘throw light on existence in its totality or in its innermost essence’ (1939:
657). In addition, the author contends that images employed as metaphysical symbols
should not be mere illusionistic replicas of the phenomenal world, but should be
distorted or ‘moulded’ in specific ways. From this it follows, that  ‘the metaphysical
symbol, differs... in important respects from every other type of symbol’ (1939: 659).

Urban defines these particular attributes of metaphysical symbols in terms of three
main characteristics: The first necessary characteristic of such images is the fact that
they are generalized, so as to reflect universal rather than specific content. This is an
important characteristic because, as Urban claims, ‘The ultimate object of
metaphysical discourse is to say something significant about the whole of reality’
(1939: 651). It is also this universal quality inherent in metaphysical symbols that
makes it possible to express the notion of an all encompassing absolute (such as the
notion of God for example). Finally, generalized images which reflect basic and
universal aspects of our reality may help contextualize the human condition as an
integrated whole.
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The second characteristic of metaphysical symbols is that they are negative
expressions, that is, they allude to an alternate reality that is outside of space and time
as we experience it. Accordingly, in order for realistic images to serve as appropriate
vehicles for metaphysical content, they must first be ‘moulded, and this moulding
takes place through a process of negation,  negation of their spatio-temporal
character’ (Urban 1939: 706).

For Urban despacialization and detemporization are significant in that they articulate
two important notions traditionally associated with the metaphysical, namely
omnipresence and the timeless present. The first of these, Urban maintains, ‘embodies
and expresses our experience or realisation of the compenetration [sic]  which negates
the externality of space, the second the interpretation which negates the mutual
externality of successive moments of time’ (1939: 707).

The third characteristic of metaphysical symbols is that they include an
anthropomorphic aspect. ‘The language of metaphysics’, Urban claims, ‘must
inevitably be anthropomorphic and its symbols taken from the human and the
personal, rather than from the abstract and impersonal, side of experience’ (1939:
665). This is a necessary component of all metaphysical symbols, without which we
would not be able to grasp their analogical relations and the abstract content they
allude to. This is so because ‘no relation is really intelligible unless it can be
understood as something analogous to relations within our own experience and its
activity’ (Urban 1939: 675).

A further characteristic of such anthropomorphism is that it also relates to the notion
of the valuable. This is an important aspect of metaphysical symbols, because in order
for such images to articulate content that may give meaning and purpose to our
existence, they have to allude to something that is inherently good and valuable in
itself.
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By utilizing symbols that suggest goodness or value we are able to allude to a
metaphysical reality characterized by positive attributes such as perfect harmony and
peace. It allows us to conceive of a divine being of love and benevolence; an almighty
protector who is inherently good. This situates our reality and existence within the
universal context of such ideal truths. By emulating and believing in such ideal values
of the metaphysical, our lives are filled with a sense of meaning and purpose. As
Urban points out, ‘We cannot think of life except as a centre of values and except as a
movement towards the good’ (1939: 701).

Urban aptly refers to anthropomorphism as the axiological aspect of metaphysical
symbols, alluding to the fact that, although such symbols aim to express that which
exceeds our frame of reference, they nonetheless have to remain rooted in the human
context.  

1.2 CONTEMPORARY IMAGING AND THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINACY

Urban’s theories of the general nature of symbolism provide clear theoretical
guidelines that may inform the visual expression of metaphysical content. There are
aspects of his theory, however, that seem at odds with the approaches contemporary
artists have adopted to imaging the metaphysical. For example, whereas the general
aim of symbolic discourse centres around the expression of specific determinate
truths, the imagery of some significant contemporary artists like Kiefer, seem to
reflect metaphysical content that does not offer any clear conception of truth. Rather
than articulating specific ‘assertions or propositions about met-empirical entities
(Urban 1939: 632), the images of Kiefer evoke‘ an atmosphere of uncertainty and
undecidability’ (Rosenthal 1987: 291). The indeterminacy inherent in these works
also seems to be intentional.  As the artist himself claims, ‘Painting now has to have a
meaning [but]  not a specific meaning’ (Rosenthal 1987: 93).  The indeterminacy in
Kiefer’s work, is evident in Kyffhäuser (Plate 1), an example from a series of images
by the same title.  The name Kyffhäuser  refers to a mythic forest.  In this image, the
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artist reworks photographs by applying paint and other materials like sand or straw, or
glueing additional photographs on top of existing ones, even writing on them.  The
lower part of the image consists of abstract shapes of varying tones with darker
gestural brushstrokes at the bottom.  Although abstract, the treatment of light in the
image evokes the sense of a landscape that is filled with a metaphysical presence and
seems in keeping with the title of the work.  The top part of the image however (a
photograph of a basement), presents a visual contrast to the imaginative reality of the
painted landscape beneath.

The fact that Kiefer wrote ‘Kyffhäuser’ across the floor of this basement suggest that
he also equates this dark, damp interior with such a mythic place.  Rather than
forming an integrated whole, a reading of the abstract and veristic elements of this
image suggest different realities that are both perceptually and intellectually
incongruent. As Rosenthal remarks, the intertextual images of Kiefer suggest
‘multiple and sometimes conflicting realities, with the result that a powerful air of
fantasy and even delusion became ever-present’ (1987:76).

Such a combination of different contexts or realities such as realism, abstraction,
found objects and text, which suggest irreconcilable contexts, may be related to
Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality. She explains the concept of intertextuality as
follows, ‘ that in the space of a given text, several utterances taken from other texts
intersect and neutralise one another. Reading for significance we undo this
neutralisation and run the threads of meaning back across all the other texts from
which our given text was formed. Hence a perpetual multiplication of meanings, as
for the polyvalent poetic word, which adheres to a logic exceeding that of codified
discourse’ (Moi 1986: 168).
15


Plate 1:  Anselm Kiefer, Kyffhäuser, (1980 – 81). 
Acrylic, emulsion and watercolour on photograph.  Francesco Clemente Collection.

In Kiefer’s images the use and combination of different styles such as realism,
abstraction and written text, may be said to encourage indeterminacy because, rather
than expressing an integrated point of view, it generates a multitude of contexts that
often elicit a number of irreconcilable interpretations. In support of this view, the
psychologist Jordaan maintains that ‘context is something without which meaning and
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understanding are impossible’ and further that  ‘to make sense of anything, we must
see it in [a specific]  context’ (1989: 47). Even though this seems to suggest that
indeterminate meaning is related to a combination of different contexts, this does not
necessarily seem to be the case. In some Pre-Renaissance imagery, different visual
contexts such as realism, abstraction and the written word are combined in such a way
as to express clear determinable concepts.

One example of this is Simone Martini’s The Annunciation (Plate 2). In this painting,
realistic figures are superimposed on an abstract and flat gold ground. The artist has
also included the text ‘ave gratia plena’ in the image, which represents a spoken
greeting from the archangel Gabriel.





Plate 2:  Simone Martini, The Annunciation, (1333).
Tempera on wood.  Galleria Degli Uffizi
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Although such a combination of disparate stylistic elements may seem similar to
Kiefer's intertextual approach to imaging, the content of this image is not
indeterminate. In fact, the symbolism of the image was widely understood and
decipherable in the context of its time and thus articulates a clear and definitive idea
of a heavenly reality. The combination of realistic figures with a flat abstract
background, suggest that these figures are spiritual beings, that occupy an alternate
reality that is spaceless. Such a negation of the spatial properties of objective reality is
also consistent with Urban’s theory of metaphysical symbolism.

It would seem, then, that there is more to intertextuality than a mere combination of
different stylistic elements. Certain combinations appear to support determinate
meaning such as demonstrated in Martini’s painting, whereas a similar approach in
Kiefer’s work reflects a more open - ended reading. How, then, does the combination
of different stylistic elements articulate indeterminate content?

For Kristeva, the answer lies with intertextual images that suggest contradictory
content. As she says, intertextual images may serve as a vehicle of contradiction: ‘it
may break the law of identity, and’ articulate an idea that is  ‘not identical with itself’
(Lechte 1990: 95). Rather than articulating distinct meanings of concepts such as light
or dark, phenomenal or noumenal, such images suggest paradoxical and contradictory
meanings  ‘expressing both one and other simultaneously’ (Lechte 1990: 96).

The indeterminacy of intertextuality is then related to a destabilization of the specified
meanings of mutually exclusive opposites, and articulates meaning that crosses the
boundaries between self and Other. For Kristeva, the indeterminacy of intertextual
images ultimately resides in the fact that the content of this type of imagery ‘ is never
entirely analysable...the signifiers do not constitute’ [a specific meaning] ‘a closed or
unified whole’ (Lechte 1990: 103). Opposites, alterity and negation can often appear
in the same image. Intertextuality, in addition to being an interpenetration and
combination of different texts may thus also be said to represent an intersection of
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meanings rather than the fixed point of a specific meaning, and as such is clearly in
contradiction to Urban’s conceptions of the metaphysical symbols.

This notion of intertextuality also bears resemblance to the poststructural theory of the
French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Derrida holds that all discourse and the concepts
that it may express are ultimately indeterminate because concepts are never isolated
existents. Instead of regarding ideas and concepts as isolated pockets of meaning,
Derrida conceives of meaning as a system of differences and oppositions between
elements. In this sense, meaning is always dependent on its opposition to other
concepts, so that the truth of any concept is always contaminated with an Other,
always implicates another. Derrida explains such contamination by what he calls
dissemination, that is a slippage of meaning from one opposite to another, of one
specific idea to another.

This implies that meaning is always elsewhere, that it is continually deferred from one
sign to another, one idea to another. As a result, signs can never refer to any ultimate
or definitive truths. Indeed, such a deferral of meaning leads to a condition of
understanding where meaning is dispersed infinitely because it  ‘spreads out amongst
undecidable ambiguities’ (Harland 1987: 133). For Derrida, meaning is something
that remains ‘perpetually unfulfilled’ [and]  ‘exists in the absence of all signifieds’
(Harland 1987: 135). Because intertextual imagery is informed by these theories, it
may also serve as a vehicle to bring to light the inherent instability and indeterminacy
of the concepts and notions of discourse.

Other authors, such as Gilmour for example, seem to voice support for the idea that an
intertextual use of imagery may prevent the viewer from arriving at a clear
conceptualization of any determinate signified. Gilmour claims that the depth of
meaning usually associated with symbolic imagery is noticeably lacking in Kiefer’s
art, and that ‘ this depth is replaced by surface or by multiple surfaces (what is often
called intertextuality is in that sense no longer a matter of depth)’ (1990: 94).
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Gilmour further argues that intertextual imagery, ‘is for the most part a conception of
practices, discourses and textual play’, which rather than focusing on deeper
symbolic meanings, suggests ‘an interplay between various kinds of signifiers’
(1990:94).  

In contrast to this view, Urban maintains that images used as metaphysical symbols
should have specific and determinate properties, that is to say, they must reflect
content that is negated and generalized and reflect specific values such as goodness.
For Urban, the primacy of symbolic truth relies on such a metaphoric relation.

The principles of intertextuality thus seem irreconcilable with those inherent in
metaphysical symbolism, and as such may interfere with the symbolic expression of
metaphysical content. In relating images with contradictory values to abstract
metaphysical ideas, it may be impossible to form a clear intelligible understanding of
the ‘truths’ that such an analogy may reveal. Furthermore, in combining different
texts (such as realism and abstraction) which represent conflicting ideas, intertextual
imagery may hinder symbolic thought processes because it emphasizes the disparate
properties inherent in the visual text itself, rather than directing our thoughts towards
the metaphysical. Finally, because of these contradictory qualities, intertextual
imagery may not reflect fixed characteristics such as negation, generalization and
value statements that are necessary for images to serve as a vehicle for metaphysical
content.

The conflicting approaches and theoretical models that are evident in Kiefer’s work
suggest an impasse. It is unclear why and how the artist used these disparate
approaches to express metaphysical content, or whether such images can do so at all.
In the following chapters, I will attempt to resolve these inconsistencies.
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CHAPTER II
CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICAL IMAGING

Having established a theoretical basis from which to analyse the varied thought
processes that inform Kiefer’s work, my aim is to determine exactly how these
opposing theoretical influences are expressed through the artist’s images. It is my
hope that such an investigation may shed light on the contradictions and
inconsistencies in Kiefer’s work and ultimately may help to determine how the artist’s
imagery expresses metaphysical content.

By stylistically analysing some of the artist’s images I hope to determine if, and to
what extent, his images may be said to adhere to the general principles of
metaphysical symbolism, such as negation, anthropomorphism and generalization.
The chapter will be divided into three separate parts, in which the relation between the
stylistic elements of Kiefer’s images and each of these principles will be addressed
separately. I hope to determine how the intertextual elements in these images affect
the symbolic attributes in these works, and the impact of this on the expression of
metaphysical content.

Not only has Kiefer’s intertextual approach to imaging served as a basic influence on
my own practical explorations, but my images, like his, reflect the symbolic
influences of varied esoteric traditions. The fact that my own work is informed by
such disparate approaches, also suggests a contradiction in terms. To address these
similar inconsistencies in my own work, I shall analyse a selection of my own images.
My intention is to come to a better understanding of my own approach to the use of
intertextuality and to demonstrate how the content of my images is informed by the
relationship between their symbolic and intertextual elements.
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2.1     NEGATION AND CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICAL IMAGING

2.1.1  Negation and Kiefer’s imagery

The concept of negation as an absence of objective space, or the denial of an object’s
existence in physical space does seem to be consistent with some of Kiefer’s use of
intertextual imagery.  In the image March Sand for example (Plate 3), a photographic
landscape is partially obscured through a gestural overpainting of actual sand.  The
application of the sand over the surface of the photograph introduces abstract shapes,
and presents a visual contrast that contradicts the veristic qualities of the landscape.
In this way, the abstract shapes of sand, in the context of the photograph, alludes to
the essence of nature behind the appearance of objective reality.  Such a negation of
the illusionistic or objective space of the landscape is consistent with Urban’s theories
of symbolism.



Plate 3:  Anselm Kiefer, March Sand, (1980).
Acrylic and sand on photograph.  Saatchi Collection, London.
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However closer consideration of the image reveals a contradiction. Kiefer’s
overpainting although negating the underlying photographic illusion of the landscape
also affirms its presence. This is because the artist used actual sand, which, being an
actual physical constituent of any given landscape, re-asserts the presence of land and
the space it may create and occupy. The overpainting is not an illusionistic
representation, but a textured addition to the flat surface of the underlying photograph.
This further emphasizes the physical presence of the sand, evoking a more vivid
conception of our experience of actual landscapes and the space alluded to.

It seems thus that Kiefer not only negates presence and space but also paradoxically
affirms it. Kiefer’s use of intertextuality, his combination of different materials such
as photographs and sand, and signifying systems (realism and abstract gestural
shapes) may be said to simultaneously affirm and negate the spatial properties of the
image in question.

Other examples of Kiefer’s paradoxical affirmation and negation of spatial properties
may be found throughout the body of his work. In Heavy Cloud (Plate 4) for example,
the introduction of an abstract lead form superimposed on the underlying
photographic landscape  gives the appearance of a metaphysical presence. This is
because the abstract and two - dimensional quality of this form, contradict the highly
illusionistic space of the landscape and therefore allude to something that does not
share the same spatial properties of objective reality. The lead shape is also an
essentially flat addition to the surface of the image, and does not conform to the
perspectival illusion of the clouds behind it. The space and physical  presence of the
object are thus brought into question, or negated. This negation of objective space is
consistent with Urban’s theory and its expression of the metaphysical.

However, as with the previous landscape, the negated qualities of the image are
contradicted by the physicality of the lead, which, in protruding from the surface of
the illusionistic
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Plate 4:  Anselm Kiefer, Heavy Cloud, (1985).
Lead and shellac on photograph.  Lila Acheson Wallace Collection.

photograph, asserts its presence as a phenomenological, very real and earthly material.
Rather than alluding to a specific idea of negated space, the image simultaneously
negates and affirms the idea of physical space, therefore rendering the spatial
characteristics of the image indeterminate.

This paradoxical characteristic of Kiefer’s expression of space may be related to
Derrida’s notion of différance. Différance as a deferral or a slippage of meaning
between two opposing concepts may also be related to such a simultaneous
affirmation and negation of the concept of spatiality. This deferral of one meaning
between mutually exclusive opposing concepts attests to a certain similarity between
such concepts, a sameness that implies an inherent relationship between two opposing
terms. For Derrida such a relationship between one term and its Other illustrates an
important aspect of poststructural theory, namely that a concept’s ultimate meaning
and value are intelligible only in the context of its relation to an opposing concept. For
Derrida, concepts are not merely self - referential, but also necessarily implicate and
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refer to other concepts. This gives paradoxical meanings to concepts, implying that
they bear their opposites within themselves.

This notion of différance whereby an image may express content that paradoxically
reflects opposing meanings is evident in Kiefer’s work.  In March Sand, for example,
the overpainted sand, which obscures and negates the spatial properties of the
underlying landscape is also the element which paradoxically affirms it. We may say
that the notion of negated space also, in part, represents the opposing notion of its
affirmation. In this sense, Kiefer’s use of  intertextual imagery not only expresses
paradoxical content, but also articulates a suspension of the differences between
opposing concepts.

It is clear then, that Kiefer’s use of negation is not consistent with Urban’s theories
because it does not allude to a definitive idea of negated space. Kiefer’s simultaneous
expression of space and its negation does not allude to distinctive concepts, but to an
intersection and contamination of opposing meanings, concepts that  ‘point away from’
themselves to their respective opposites  ‘even before they are themselves’ (Harland
1987: 147).

In addition to the negation of space, Urban’s theories also hold that symbolic images
should allude to the negation of time as it is experienced by consciousness as
consecutive moments. Urban claims that this detemporization of imagery is necessary
in order for images to be suggestive of the metaphysical, more specifically, so they
may suggest an omni-present, a time outside of ordinary time.

Many of Kiefer’s intertextual images do in fact seem to suggest detemporization,
which is achieved by means of supplementarity, that is, a doubling of similar content.
This may be demonstrated with reference to an image from the book Brandenburg
Sand (Plate 5). As with March Sand, the overpainted sand in this particular example
negates as well as affirms the presence of the landscape.
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However, this image also suggests a present moment on top of another moment. The
intertextual approach draws attention to the photograph and overpainted sand as
successive layers that were created at different moments in time. If this image were
just a traditional photograph, we would read the entire image as the representation of
one integrated presence and as one moment in time, but the intertextual nature of the
image utilising diverse elements such as photographs and actual sand suggests a
double presence, firstly the presence of the land at the particular moment the
photograph was taken and secondly, the presence of the sand (taken from the actual
landscape) which was overpainted at another particular moment in time




Plate 5:  Anselm Kiefer, Brandenburg Sand,  pp. 34 -35.  (1980).

At first one might assume that the suggestion of these different moments in time may
suggest a distinctive temporization, because it suggests successive (different)
moments in time, that is a sequential linear conception of time. However, because the
overpainted sand may be regarded as not just another metaphorical presence of the
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landscape conceived at another different moment in time, but as a supplement or a re-
representation of the photographic landscape underneath, it also detemporizes the
image according to the logic of supplementarity. The artist’s intention to re-represent
the photographic landscape is demonstrated by the fact that he used sand, as well as
the fact that the overpainting mimics the perspectival lines of the photographic
landscape beneath it.

In order for the overpainted sand to come into being as a supplement, the spaces in
between the sand, constituted by the photographic landscape, must be regarded as
‘empty space’, for it is this becoming (negative) space of the photographic image that
allows the sand to present itself to the viewer’s consciousness at a particular moment
in time. However, the sand as a supplement takes the place of the photographic
landscape. It serves as a substitute for the ‘absent presence’ of the photographic image
which has now become ‘empty space’. But this substitute (sand) is belated in regard to
the presence of the photographic image, it takes over a present moment which has
already passed - a past present, and thus is an after-effect so to speak.

The original presence of the photographic landscape is also not a full presence, a
specific independent moment in time, because it is supplemented. This means that the
present moment of the photographic landscape is delayed and deferred until the
viewer can read the supplemented presence (the sand) which is supposed to make up
for the lack of the original presence. The present moment to which the photograph
refers, also refers to a future present moment (that is the moment at which the viewer
reads the overpainted sand as a replacement or re-representation of the landscape).

In the final analysis, then, Kiefer expresses a landscape that is present in different
moments in time, and also that these different moments in time are the same because
they both allude to the presence of the same landscape. As a result, this image does
not refer to any specific moment in time, but rather negates the idea of temporality. It
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suggests an indeterminate moment in time that is divided and split from its inception -
that is at once itself and Other.

This seems to be consistent with Urban’s idea that metaphysical symbols should be
de-temporized, that is to say, that they should represent a non - specific moment in
linear time. As Urban says, an image that is detemporized suggests a present which is
not present, that is ‘ a present which is [not]  localised in time’ (1939: 707).  This is
also consistent with Derrida’s conception of supplementarity which suggests a present
which is already a past, that is to say, a present that is already deferred or elsewhere,
and therefore not localisable in present time.

However, Derrida’s conception of deferred presence, that is, of an indeterminate
present, is also explained as having the effect of temporization. In fact, Derrida claims
that it is this very indeterminacy or incompleteness of a represented moment in time,
that constitutes the possibility of the existence of space, that allows for a presence to
represent itself to consciousness at a particular temporized moment in time.

It seems that Kiefer’s use of intertextual imagery is not merely indicative of
detemporization, but also of temporization. More precisely, one could argue that
Kiefer’s use of imagery suggests a simultaneous temporization as well as a
detemporization.
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2.1.2  Negation and my imagery

The images in Plate 6 and 7 consist of a combination of realistic figures with an
abstract background. These intertextual images suggests a negated ‘space’, that is, a
metaphysical space rather than an objective one. This results from the fact that the
figures are represented floating on an abstract background, rather than in any
phenomenally recognizable background and space that bears the attributes of
objective reality. They seem to have been taken out of ordinary space and time.

The empty background suggested by the dark even tonalities that surround the
immediate space around the figures has a border (the lighter diffuse edge around the
borders of the painting). The lighter tone of these borders suggests that the
background itself has a background, which prompts a shift in perception. When we
regard the lighter edges of the painting as a background of the darker, more even,
tonal field in the centre, it causes the darker field to appear not as an emptiness but as
a positive flat foreground. This emphasizes the flatness of the picture plane,
accentuating not the illusionistic space suggested by the realistic figures, but rather the
actual physical surface of the canvas. Therefore the intertextuality in these paintings
may be said not only to negate spatiality, but also to affirm it. This renders the spatial
attributes of these images indeterminate.
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Plate 6:   J A Opperman, Untitled, (2001). Oil on canvas. Private Collection.
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Plate 7:   J A Opperman, Untitled, (2001). Oil on canvas. Private Collection.

In another image entitled, Of Metaphysics and Algebra (Plate 8) traditional
metaphysical  concepts are suggested by means of reference to numbers. The number
two, for example, represented by the two figures facing one another, articulates the
universal underlying principle of opposition, the dyad. Dyads have traditionally been
associated with metaphysical principles. These are forces of opposition that may be
said to define the basic underlying principles of our world, such as the sun and the
moon, heaven and earth, ‘knowledge and ignorance, good and evil, Gnostic light and
darkness’(Elkins 1999: 54). The dyad does not merely represent two separate
opposing forces, but is also the basis for synthesis that may yield a third principle. The
notion of three (represented in the painting by the negative/empty spaces between the
four dots above the figures) also has many connotations.  In alchemy, three
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Plate 8:  J A Opperman, Of Metaphysics and Algebra, (2001).
Oil on canvas, Private Collection.

represents the hypostatical principles of body, mind and soul.  In Christian belief the
number three also has great importance in that it represents the three fundamental
aspects of God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The number four (represented
in the painting by the four hands which align with the four dots above them), is
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usually associated with the basic constituents of the phenomenal world, such as the
four classical Greek elements: earth, water, fire and air. To alchemists, Elkins says,
‘the four elements are everywhere’ (1999: 57). The number four also has other
symbolic connotations, such as the four sacred animals (lion, eagle, man and cow) the
four movements of nature, (ascendant, descendant, horizontal and circular), and the
four terms of metaphysics (being, essence, potential and action).

Reading the painting from the bottom upwards, (Fig. 2) it may be noted that the two
realistic figures express physical objective space, demarcated by the two distinct and
separate spaces that their volumes occupy. The combination of their hands, which in
the painting are horizontally aligned, suggests a synthesis, the number four (the four
elements) 2+2=4. However on the side of each figure is written ‘A of B’ and ‘B of A’,
which suggests that the figures ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively are not mutually exclusive
but rather in some way related.  They are not only distinct opposing figures, but there
is also a similarity between them.


Figure 2
By stating ‘A of B’ the left hand figure refers not only to itself but also to the Other,
its opposite (figure B) and suggests that the figure ‘A’ is only an aspect of figure ‘B’
(an A of B). The same can be said of figure ‘B’ which is also not a fully present
figure, a thing in itself, but also only just an aspect of ‘A’ (a B of A).
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In this sense figure ‘A’ cannot be regarded as a full presence, as a complete and
specifically affirmed spatial presence in itself, that stands on its own in complete
opposition to an alternate figure ‘B’. We are here invited to think of difference as
différance, that the figures are not only different but also identical. The presence of
the text (the letters A and B) causes a certain deferral of meaning. Firstly there is a
deferral of the idea that these figures are completely different and occupy separate
spaces, and secondly, a deferral of the idea that the hands of the two figures add up to
four hands. Here two hands of two figures allude to the number four but because these
figures are also identical, the two hands of these two figures allude to the number two.

Although these realistic figures may appear to represent objective space they also
suggest the negation of space, that is, a space that is not a distinct, self-identical
volume. The notion of space implied by these figures is one of two distinct volumes
and also of a volume occupying two distinct places in space. This alludes to an idea of
spatiality that is inconsistent with our objective experience.

Spatiality in this image, then, is rendered indeterminate. The realistic rendering of the
figures suggests space and volume, but the text (A of B) (B of A) associated with
these figures defers the conceptualisation of a definitive presence of the spaces that
the figures occupy.

The four dots above the hands of the figures represent the four elements and as such
suggest aspects of the phenomenal world. They represent objective space and time.
Their spatiality is affirmed, not by an illusionistic approximation of our world, but by
the specific spaces that they occupy on the surface area of the canvas. The three areas
in between these dots, the negative ‘empty’ spaces, represent the trinity. The concept
of the phenomenal (the four) is represented as having positive spatial properties, and
the concept of the metaphysical (three), represented as negative space, may be
regarded as two opposing ideas. In the image under question, however, the three
empty spaces are in between the four dots, and as such are the necessary spaces that
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enable a separation of these dots, that make it possible for us to read them as four
separate dots that occupy different points on the picture plane.  Accordingly, the four
positive dots must simultaneously refer to their opposites, the three negative spaces.
Ultimately, then, the four dots allude to the notion ‘four’ as a contaminated concept
rather than as an independent fixed one. The dots signify themselves as well as the
three negative spaces. 

Conversely, the three negative spaces can also only exist as three separate spaces if
they are demarcated by the dots. As a result the identity of the three negatives is in
part constituted by these positive demarcations. Accordingly, the three empty spaces
are also contaminated because they not only signify themselves but also refer to the
positive demarcations.

Ultimately, then, the negative spaces (the metaphysical trinity) and the four dots
(representing phenomenal space) are represented as if contaminated by each other.
The representation thus alludes to a contamination of the opposing notions or
concepts of the heavenly and the earthly realm. The representation may be argued to
render indeterminate the suggested symbolic properties associated with the numbers
three and four.   Here 3 =3 but also 4 and conversely 4=4 but also 3.
        
This reciprocal ‘contamination’ of the positive space (dots) with the empty space
(between these dots) also negates the spatial properties of the image because it
suggests a positive space that is somehow also a negative space and vice versa. This
in itself certainly concurs with Urban’s notion of the representation of the
metaphysical through negation, because the image represents a space that is not a
space as we would normally conceive of it,  as clearly specified dots and negative
spaces on the picture plane.

However, the image not only implies a negation of spatiality but it also paradoxically
affirms it.  It may be argued that it is this very relation to Other that negates the idea
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of specific negative and positive spaces, that makes it possible to see the dots and the
negative spaces in the first place. It is by virtue of a minimal relation to the empty
space, that the four dots can be what they are, can present themselves to
consciousness as the illusion of positive space occupying the picture plane.

The symbolic ‘algebra’ implied by the whole image suggests that 2 + 2 (hands) = 4
but also 2, moreover that the 4 (the four dots) = 4 but also 3. The image as a whole
confounds and renders indeterminate the notion of spatiality. It suggests space as both
affirmed (positive)  and negated (negative), and renders indeterminate the specific
metaphysical concepts related to the numerical symbolism.   

2.2  ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICAL IMAGING 

2.2.1 Anthropomorphism and Kiefer’s imagery

Kiefer’s images also seem to suggest anthropomorphism, in that his choice and
manipulation of imagery imply that he is concerned with personal and emotive
content. Many of his images are suggestive of human elements, but no sooner are
these elements expressed than they are negated. For example, Kiefer often uses
images of either wooden (in his earlier works), or brick interiors; places that bear
specific value or importance. These interiors are, however, always large empty
structures, sometimes with only a few flames burning against a far wall, such as can
be seen in Sulamite (Plate 9) and To the Supreme Being.
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Plate 9:  Anselm Kiefer, Sulamite, (1983).
Oil emulsion, shellac on canvas, Saatchi Collection.

When Kiefer makes reference to specific and significant individuals or beings in his
works, such as in March Sand (cf. Plate 3, pp 20), he often indicates their presence by
scribbling  their names over the surface of a vast landscape, rather than utilizing
images. These floating diminutive texts in relation to such expansive landscape seem
rather impersonal and inexpressive and diminish the anthropomorphic qualities of the
images.

In Kiefer’s imagery of technology, compiled in the book Birth of the Sun (cf. Plates
13, 14, 15 and 16, pp.  48 - 50) anthropomorphic structures are placed in a strange
empty interiors. Often these buildings seem old and abandoned as if they do not serve
any purpose any more. As a result these images seem more indicative of a reminder of
a past human presence than an actual one. As Rosenthal notes, ‘Although each of
Kiefer’s buildings preserves some passing thought- an artist, idea or deity- the
structures as a whole are lifeless’ (1987: 119).
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Even though Kiefer’s photographic images depict empty interiors, or landscapes that
seems to negate human presence, they are often overpainted in a highly gestural
manner which imbues them with an expressive (personal) quality. This seems to
suggest that Kiefer paradoxically negates and affirms the anthropomorphic elements
in his work

The fact that Kiefer’s imagery reflects borrowing from various preceding styles, and
some of his content seem to be appropriated, negates or subtracts from its
anthropomorphic characteristics (its personal expressive value). In appropriation,
which is ‘the conscious quotation of a pre-existing image, style or historical
antecedents’ (Biro 1999: 155) the impersonality of communication is emphasized, a
world in which nothing is ever added, invented, changed or improved upon. ‘What is
appropriated is stripped of any power or mystery, and reduced to a rationalized,
sterilized series of facts and image’ (Biro 1999: 150). Yet ‘in Kiefers work there is
always some sort of active transformation - some conscious and critical recasting of
the original model as opposed to a passive transmission (Biro 1999: 156). Because of
this, Kiefer’s work does not merely negate the anthropomorphic but also
paradoxically retain an element of personal expression through the particular choice
and combination of his images.

Kiefer’s work thus articulates neither human and personal qualities nor an absence of
such qualities. It may rather be said that there are anthropomorphic traces in his
images that are neither simply present nor absent, but seem to be in a constant state of
withdrawal. As Taylor puts it, ‘This site of desertion is the no place of a certain
withdrawal. Something is always slipping away, always missing in Kiefer’s art’
(1992: 292).

Instead of expressing definitive anthropomorphic elements, which according to
Urban, enables the viewer to relate to metaphysical symbols and interpret its content,
Kiefer  expresses anthropomorhism paradoxically. This may be said to hinder the
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viewer’s identification with the metaphysical symbols in the artist’s work and a
subsequent understanding of its content, adding to its indeterminacy. 

There are also other aspects of anthropomorphism, such as the notion of value, that
the content of Kiefer’s images may be said to articulate in a paradoxical manner. For
Urban, it is necessary to situate metaphysical concepts within the context of
humanistic qualities that reflect both value and goodness. In reflecting such qualities,
symbolic images might articulate an idealized conception of the metaphysical, as
something that may have a positive influence on our lives, and that reflects truths that
are of value to us. It is this kind of content, Urban holds, that may imbue our whole
existence with a sense of significance and purpose.

Kiefer’s images that allude to various religious concepts and ideologies seem to
articulate the notion of value and the good. In some of his more recent works such as
the ‘Emanation’ series, his imagery seems to allude to the coming of a new
enlightened world order, as the heavenly (God) revealing himself to the world. In
Heavy Cloud (cf. Plate 4, pp. 22) for example, the artist poured lead over the
photographic image of a landscape, the abstract shape of which suggests a revelation
or outpouring of a divine metaphysical presence. This outpouring from heaven or
‘emanation’, forms part of the doctrines of Jewish mysticism that give credence to the
notion of the divine light(s) in which the ‘heavenly is made manifest and meets the
earthly in a rapprochement of seemingly great significance, [which is intended] to
restore us again to a higher spiritual condition’ (Rosenthal 1987: 138).

The abstract, uneven, lead shape also invites an analogy between itself and the
underlying photograph of an overcast cloudy sky on which it is superimposed, and
may also be suggestive of God’s appearance as a cloud to the Israelites during their
exile in the desert. Even though this work seems to suggest and affirm metaphysical
ideality and its values, there are elements to the work that may contradict such a
reading.
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In the title, for example, the artist refers to the emanation,  (the lead pouring) as a
‘heavy’ cloud, which as Rosenthal notes, may be regarded as a pun on ‘heavy water...
a synonym for radiation’ (1998: 108). In physics, heavy water refers to the process of
nuclear fission which is facilitated by water in which heavy hydrogen is replaced by
ordinary hydrogen. This punning, which invites an analogy between the suggested
emanation and the process of nuclear fission, a dangerous and destructive force,
seems to contradict and devalue the pure and virtuous qualities of the emanation. In
addition, Kiefer’s use of lead for the emanation further questions its  heavenly
qualities, since lead is also used in nuclear reactors as a means to contain dangerous
radiation. Underneath and along the edges of the lead shape, the brownish colour of
shellac can also clearly be seen which also seems to suggest a toxic radiation leakage.
The emanation in this image thus seems to express not only the virtuous qualities of a
heavenly substance, but paradoxically also points to a negative, destructive quality
that may be inherent in it. Again this paradoxical affirmation and negation of the
concept of value invites a poststructuralist reading: that the emanation engendering
the metaphysical notion of the valuable, the good, may also be said to bear the trace of
its opposite:  evil and destruction.

In another landscape, Nigredo (Plate 10), Kiefer painted deep receding lines (over a
photograph of a landscape) that lead off into the horizon. The image is painted in dark
sombre tones in a textured manner which suggests a devastated, burnt and empty
landscape. The title of the work suggests that this blackening of the land, represents
an alchemical process in which alchemists attempted to transform the ordinary, the
physical, to a purified or transcended state, one of eternal perfection. In such a
process, the alchemist also embarks on a process of self transformation.

‘The moment of nigredo is a critical, first plateau of achievement. An egg is placed in
the athanor furnace, where a symbolic sexual union occurs: the hot, solar male and
cold lunar female interact. This event is filled with pain, rage, killing and
putrefication, matter is destroyed and opposites dissolve into the liquid nigredo. [It is]
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a darkness darker than darkness and is associated with a return to a pre-
cosmological chaos. The phase ends with the appearance on the surface of a starry
aspect in which a glow begins to be seen in the sky’(Rosenthal 1987: 127).

The appearance of an illuminated aspect can be seen in the particular lightness of the
upper - sky of the image. The content of this image thus seems to allude to the idea of
a spiritual transformation which may lead to the revelation of a new enlightened
world.  The fact that the image symbolizes the revelation of a metaphysical truth that
may imbue our lives with goodness and value is also in keeping with Urban’s
theories.



Plate 10:  Anselm Kiefer, Nigredo, (1984).
Oil, acrylic, shellac on photograph.  Philidelphia Museum of Art

However, in contrast to Urban who equates metaphysical truth exclusively with
goodness and perfection, the alchemical elements in the painting suggest that such a
truth is obtained through pain and destruction. Kiefer seems to bring this to the
viewer’s attention by emphasising the devastation of the landscape. The blackening of
the landscape suggests that the process of transcendence also bears the ‘potential for
terrible and sinister experiences of blackness, of spiritual death, of a descent into hell’
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(Rosenthal 1998: 127).  It seems that Kiefer is trying to convey an idea that the
metaphysical not only reflects the qualities of goodness and virtue but also a
dangerous aspect: that the quest of purity and value requires a detour through death
and destruction.  

Such a reading of this image also represents Derrida’s concept of the trace; the notion
that all reference to self (value and goodness) takes place by way of a detour through
an Other and that ‘a concept or entity includes in one way or another, what it is
opposed to’ (Gasche 1986: 187).

In articulating a notion of value and goodness that also contains traces of an Other,
Kiefer’s images render our specific ideas about the metaphysical indeterminate.
Because of this indeterminacy, these images allude to metaphysical content that does
not articulate any definitive truth. It does not allude to something we can understand
though specific meanings such as goodness or evil. As Biro suggests, ‘ There is
nothing to guarantee any ultimate truth behind Kiefer’s works and thus no
hermeneutic teleology, no sense that with time and care one’s interpretation will
arrive at some completely accurate and encompassing result’ (1999: 59). Because of
this, the metaphysical content of Kiefer’s images is not consistent with Urban’s views.
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2.2.2  Anthropomorphism in my imagery

In all of my own works, veristic images of figures are present, and insofar as these
figures form a central area of interest or focus in the paintings they contribute an
anthropomorphic quality. The representation of the nude human body, for instance,
represents a cognitive and perceptual immediacy of human presence, not merely in
terms of the physical, but also emotively and spiritually. The spiritual presence that
these representations may evoke is further facilitated by the fact that the figures are
rendered on an abstract background, as if dislocated from ordinary phenomenal space
and time.

Beneath these figures, in Plate 11 for instance the letter ‘A’ is printed. Although the
‘A’ signifies or refers to the figure above it, which emphasizes the image as a
represented presence of humanity, the figure may also conversely be said to signify or
refer to ‘A’. In this sense the figure not only signifies itself, but also refers to an
Other, that is, an ‘A’. Here the ‘A’ as a label may be said to defer the complete human
presence of the figure as such, for it implies that the meaning of the figure is
implicated or dependent on the label ‘A’, an Other extraneous value. As a result, the
image is never self-identical, never coincides fully with itself, it does not signify itself
but also an Other. This defers and displaces the anthropomorphic presence of the
figure.

The presence of a value ‘B’ further defers any determinate anthropomorphic qualities
of the image, because it implies that the value of ‘A’ is also somehow determined by,
and dependent on, the value of ‘B’. The labelling which defers the immediate
complete conception of the anthropomorphic presence of the figure (of the figure as
figure, self - identical with itself) may also make the viewer aware that the painted
figure is itself merely a signifier (like a picture in an encyclopaedia, for example). It
implies that the figure also refers to the actual person who is the subject of the image,
in other words, it points (signifies) away from itself; it does not
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Plate 11:  J A Opperman, Untitled, (2000).  Oil on canvas.  Private Collection.

signify only an anthropomorphic presence, but also the absence of an original human
presence. Because the A and B in each painting refers to or is coupled with different
figures occupying different poses, it implies that the value of each ‘A’ that is hinted at
but never disclosed is not the same in each case.  The labels of ‘A’ and ‘B’ then
function as place holders, not only for an indeterminate value ‘X’, but also for
continuously alternating values. This further contributes to the hermetic quality of
indeterminateness to which the figures and the paintings as a whole allude.
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Detail:  Plate 11
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The labels ‘A’ or ‘B’ may then be said to simultaneously signify or represent the
anthropomorphic images present in the painting, and paradoxically to negate or defer
a full or complete conception of such anthropomorphic qualities. They render
indeterminate the anthropomorphic qualities in the corpus of the paintings as a whole.

In another work entitled  a (d) scention (Plate 12), a figure can be seen upside down
with arms outstretched, as if falling from the sky. The notion of descending may be
interpreted in religious terms as a process of being cast from the heavens, of fallen
grace or a descent into hell. Below the realistically rendered figure is written the title
of the work, a (d) scention, which, contrary to the realistic image, suggests an
‘ascension’, generally connected with the notion of spiritual growth and
enlightenment (of value).  As a result the intertextuality of the image may be said to
be disjunctive, that is, the realistic image seems to imply the opposite of the written
elements in the work.

Attached to the bottom of the painting is a piece of string. By pulling the string
downwards the ‘falling’ figure can be seen moving downwards, its arms disappearing
behind the lower panel of the canvas (Figure 3. b) However, as the arms disappear
below, they can be seen simultaneously re - appearing from above (Figure 3 a). This
suggests that the line from which the arms seem to be appearing and disappearing is
the same space, that the bottom, ‘b’, is also the top ‘a’.  In effect, what is represented
is the paradoxical notion that the figure is not only falling down , but also, so to speak,
falling upward, that is, it is descending and ascending at  the same time. Stated in
other terms, the figure is moving in opposite directions simultaneously.
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Figure 3.

The intertextual image may also be said to render the notion of the valuable, or the
good (ascension) indeterminate. It suggests that the notion of the valuable or good is
contaminated by its opposite (descension), in that it may be said that the one
(ascension) contains the trace of the other (descension).

The image may also be related to Nigredo in the sense that it also suggests that the
notion of the valuable, the good, (ascension) can only take place via its other
(descension). It suggests that in order to ascend to a higher spiritual state of goodness,
one first has to descend, to fall from grace. In this way the content of the image
questions the exclusivity of the notions of ascension and descension. It renders these
traditionally held opposing concepts indeterminate and implies a double movement,  a
(d) scension as well as a simultaneous ascension.
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Plate 12:  J A Opperman, a (d) scention, (2001).  Oil on canvas.  Private Collection.

Rather than attaching specific values and ideas such as ascension or descension to the
metaphysical content of the image, I intended this image to allude to a metaphysical
idiom that is independent of such limited human values, something that exceeds the
scope of such linguistic categories.  I also hoped to convey the idea that the
experience of spiritual growth may not be a one-sided process, but may concern the
relation and interaction between opposing experiences and ideas. 
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2.3   GENERALIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICAL IMAGING

2.3.1 Generalization in Kiefer’s imagery

In symbolically articulating such notions as emanations and the divine Kiefer’s
imagery  expresses the absolute and the universal. In Heavy Cloud for example (cf.
Plate 4, pp 22), the abstract lead shape in the landscape suggests a divine emanation or
revelation, an absolute universal force or being beyond the ordinary. The abstract
shape of this emanation and its relative size in relation to the contrasting veristic
photographic landscape is what lends the form its generalized qualities, that which
allows the image to be read as a symbolic image of the absolute.

Abstraction has long been regarded as a means of representing that which is universal. 
Worringer, for instance, claims that all metaphysical art, ‘remote from all reverent
affirmation of the phenomenal world, seeks to create for itself a picture of things that
shifts them far beyond the finiteness and conditionality of the living into a zone of the
... abstract’ (1967: 133).

Inasmuch as Kiefer’s intertextual imagery reflects the use of abstraction and its
consequent generalization, which facilitates the expression of the notion of the
absolute, it seems to be consistent with Urban’s notion of metaphysical symbolism.

However, the sheer physicality, texture and protrusion of the lead from the surface of
the illusionistic background also asserts itself, which seems to contradict and diminish
the universal qualities of the abstract shape. The lead makes the image at once more
physical, and more temporal than the flat illusionistic photographic landscape beneath
it. It becomes less a symbol of a universal  divine and more a sign of specific physical
aspects of our phenomenal realm. Yet again, Kiefer’s use of intertextuality seems
paradoxical and disjunctive. It simultaneously suggests a universal concept as well as
a finite one, the universal as well as the specific.
49

In the series of images, entitled The Birth of the Sun (Plate 13) the use of generalized
imagery that alludes to a universal divine force is also evident.


Plate 13:  Anselm Kiefer, Birth of the Sun, pp.  11 – 12.


Plate 14:  Anselm Kiefer, Birth of the Sun, pp.  17 - 18
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Plate 15:  Anselm Kiefer, Birth of the Sun, pp.  19 – 20.


Plate 16:  Anselm Kiefer, Birth of the Sun, pp.  21 - 22

The series of images begins with an image of a lead aircraft, suspended from the
ceiling in one of Kiefer's  studios, at the bottom is written ‘Isis searches for the parts
of Osiris’ so linking the plane to the Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris. According to
this myth, Isis, the wife of Osiris, (who has been dismembered) goes in search for his
51
body parts in order to resurrect him. The images that follow resemble landscape
photographs taken from an aerial perspective, partially obscured by washes of red clay
and embedded ceramic bits. The second half of the book consists of black - and -
white photographs of water streaming into a ‘reactor ‘ tank suggested by upright fuel
rods. In addition Kiefer has painted liquid silver over many of the photographs, so that
they may suggest an energy discharge. In the last photograph, broken pieces of
ceramic can be seen scattered across the floor, which as Biro notes is a ‘possible
reference to the kabbalistic notion of a divine force breaking the vessels that sought to
contain it, thus connecting the modern age to yet another ancient mythic time frame’
(1999: 219). Kiefer’s use of lead, silver and copper in the work also suggests an
alchemical process of transformation. What is of importance here is that ‘by
contrasting the real genesis of a star [implied by the title] with the birth of gods and
the invention of human technologies... the book hints at a parallel between the
natural, spiritual and mortal worlds’ (Biro 1999: 219).

The images suggest a greater historical circulation or transformation of energy, ‘a
stream that issues not only in power produced by human hands but also in the birth of
suns and the actions of the gods’ (Biro 1999: 221). This energy may be interpreted as
a universal divine force, a totality behind the everyday world, and so the image may
be regarded as a universal symbol of this divine force. Such an articulation of an
underlying universal totality is consistent with Urban’s notion of the metaphysical in
that it alludes to one all- encompassing whole.

Even though the absolute is believed to be more than just a simple collection of all the
finite elements in the universe, something that exceeds our frame of reference because
we are unable to comprehend it in its entirety, Urban maintains that we have to
conceive of it in finite terms, as a unified whole that is complete in itself. Such a
seemingly limited view of the absolute is necessary because, Urban contends, if we do
not conceive of the absolute as a specific thing, a singularity, we will not be able to
believe in a universal whole that encompasses and includes everything in it.
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Contrary to this view, Kiefer combines many different traditional metaphysical
idioms, such as the alchemical, Jewish mysticism, and Egyptian mythology. Even
though these culturally and ideologically disparate metaphysical forms of discourse
all allude to and express notions of an absolute or deity; they are also fundamentally
different in their doctrines and belief structures, and point towards their own
individual conceptions of such a totality. In a sense, the intertextual imagery of The
Birth of The Sun articulates different and multiple conceptions of the absolute. It
refers to universal totalities rather than a universal totality, so undermining any
conception of an all-encompassing universal whole. Evidently, this approach is at
odds with Urban’s view on the subject.

These inconsistencies in Kiefer’s use of generalization, however, seem to be
consistent with Derrida’s view on the subject. As Derrida claims, a theme such as the
alchemical content of Kiefer’s work, which suggests a striving towards the absolute,
is ‘a constituted unity of substance...[and] exercises a totalizing function with regard
to all the signifiers of a work. The theme secures a work’s unitary meaning, its inner
continuity’. Derrida also claims that the universality that the theme can express, ‘can
succeed only if there is no other competing theme’ (Gasche 1986: 263). In suggesting
various competing metaphysical themes, Kiefer’s work impairs the totalizing function
of the work as a whole, that is, it inhibits the viewer in conceiving of a unitary
metaphysical concept that suggests a singular all-embracing totality. As Biro notes,
‘Kiefer’s works uncover shifting constellations of problems, not clear hierarchies of
meaning of definite contexts of orientation’ (1999: 77).

Furthermore, because the underlying absolute force that these various themes allude
to is in a sense a repetition of these original totalities, it also lacks the primacy of a
self-referential whole, because it takes the place of an already incomplete and absent
whole: ‘it is already inscribed within the space of repetition and splitting or doubling
of the self’ (Gasche 1986: 291). The representation of a universal totality in this image
never adds up, never coincides with itself. This notion of a totality always seems to
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bear the trace of a remainder, a part of the whole that is missing.  It would seem then
that Kiefer’s use of intertextuality, although alluding to a universal concept,
simultaneously negates this concept, thus rendering this notion indeterminate.

This paradoxical articulation of totalization and non - totalization in Kiefer’s imagery
may also be said to be applicable to the corpus of his work. Kiefer’s intertextual
imaging which combines various disparate symbolic systems with unique conceptions
of a universal totality, may also be said to dislocate and disrupt any coherent and
unitary conception of an all-embracing absolute. 

2.3.2 Generalization and my imagery

My work entitled Seat of the Soul  (Plate 17 and 18), was informed by the notion of the
essence of the self, the soul. The notion of a determinable essence of the self is
certainly a universal metaphysical concept in that it is generally regarded as the point
of origin and basic ground of existence, as the irreducible centre which connects all
aspects of our being. ‘As the subject of thought, memory, emotion, desire and action,
the soul [is] an entity that makes self-consciousness possible…and accounts for
personal identity or a persons continued identity through time’ (Cambridge dictionary
of philosophy. Ed. R. Audi.. 754).

The work itself consists of two parts, the painting and a device (consisting of three
glass plates) through which to view the painted image (Figure 4). When viewed, a
reflection of the viewer’s eye is seen above the horizontal figure in the painting. This
was achieved by positioning a small mirror in the direct line of sight between the eye
and the image. My intention was to invite people to consider the analogy between the
soul and the eye, an analogy informed by a vast historical tradition. One such analogy,
for example, is the age-old
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Plate 17:  J A Opperman, Seat of the Soul, (2001). 
Oil on canvas.  Private Collection

belief that the eyes are the windows to the soul. The notion of self-reflection is an
important one in traditional metaphysical philosophy. Self-reflection is believed not
only to enable a simple perception of appearances of the outer world, but also to
enable an intuitive understanding of the essence of things. Such thought holds that it is
a means to intuitively grasp the ‘Ding an Sicht’ or essence, believed to exist behind
the world of appearances (their physical attributes).
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Plate 18:  J A Opperman, Seat of the Soul, (2001).

As the philosopher Husserl says,  ‘The phenomonality of phenomena, that is, their
quality of appearing as themselves to themselves, [to see oneself seeing oneself]
distinguishes them insofar as they constitute the realm of meaning, from sheer
mundane existence’ (Gasche 1986: 229).      

The reflection of the viewer’s eye as seen projected on the surface of the painting (Fig
4 b) is isolated from the rest of the physiognomy, so that just the pupil and part of the
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iris can be seen. This means of isolation may be said to generalize the projected image
of the eye through a removal of the personal attributes of the viewer’s facial features.
It allows the viewer to regard the eye not as a specific eye, but as a generalized image
that refers to the universal concept of the eye, a locus of the essence of the self.

In utilizing the reflection of the viewer’s eye, and isolating it from the viewer’s other
facial features, I hoped to evoke, through metaphorical means, the universal idea of a
metaphysical presence, the essence of the self. This use of a generalized image to
express a universal concept is in keeping with Urban’s notions of metaphysical
symbols.

a b
 c
 d
()

Figure 4.

However, it was also my intention that such an isolation of the reflection of the eye, as
well as the fact that it is seen in the completely dislocated context of the painting,
should evoke a sense of disquiet and unease. I hoped that this would cause people to
experience a dislocation of their presence : a conception of two distinct selves, the ‘I’
who looks and the ‘eye’ of an Other that looks back. It presupposes the viewer as a
self that looks from one side but also looks back from the opposite side, suggesting
that the self and the essence that it alludes to are split and doubled. This doubling
denies or inhibits the viewer from seeing himself as himself, and by extension denies
the intuitive conception (via self-reflexivity) of a universal metaphysical essence that
is whole and singular.
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 This conception of the self as double also negates the idea of essence as a purely
interior attribute. This results from the fact that the projected reflection of the self
(essence) as a double situates the essence outside the self, that is, as part of the
painting and not a wholly pure internal aspect of the viewer who is looking. This is
inconsistent with more traditional beliefs on the subject and also with Urban’s idea
that metaphysical essences are unique wholes. For Urban, the soul cannot be
described except as ‘an ens… a substance’ (1939:696). Analogous to physical
substances, metaphysical entities (such as the soul) is thus understood as things that
have distinctive, individual  identities. They are deemed singular, integrated wholes
that exists independently of other substances (essences).

Although this work symbolically alludes to the notion of a metaphysical essence, it
also paradoxically inhibits and negates such an expression, and therefore, the image in
question may be said to render the universal or generalized concept of a spiritual
essence indeterminate.
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CHAPTER III

3.1  TOWARDS A CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICAL AESTHETIC

It would seem that the characteristics of metaphysical symbols such as negation,
generalization and anthropomorphism are indeed present in Kiefer’s intertextual
imagery, but that Kiefer’s use of these notions cannot be said to be wholly consistent
with the principles of metaphysical symbolism proposed by Urban. This results from
Kiefer’s paradoxical use and application of negation, generalization and
anthropomorphism. The simultaneous affirmation and denial of these concepts
renders their inherent meaning and function indeterminate.

It has also been demonstrated that the indeterminacy present in intertextual imagery is
consistent with various poststructural principles, developed by Derrida. The fact that
Kiefer’s images clearly reflect both the attributes of symbolic and poststructural
thought processes seems to suggest that it was the artist’s intention to combine such
disparate approaches. In fact, the various stylistic analyses of the artist’s images hint
at a relationship between these approaches: that the symbolic elements inform
Kiefer’s intertextual explorations and their resulting indeterminacy by providing the
initial material for a consequent deconstruction of such content. What seemed at the
beginning of this investigation an insurmountable contradiction in Kiefer’s work now
appears partially reconcilable. The indeterminacy inherent in the artist’s work seems
dependent on a synthesis between more traditional symbolic and poststructural
thought processes.

Even so, this still does not provide a feasible explanation of how Kiefer’s intertextual
images may in fact express the metaphysical, or whether they are able to do so at all.
If it is assumed, for argument’s sake, that these images express metaphysical content,
it clearly cannot be attributed entirely to the negated, general or anthropomorphic
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properties of these works. Kiefer’s particular manipulation of imagery suggests,
rather, that any metaphysical content in these intertextual images may be informed by
their characteristic indeterminacy. In short, the major concern remains whether
intertextual imagery can serve as a vehicle for metaphysical concepts, given the
characteristic absence of any and all determinate signifieds in such images. The
resolution of this problem requires further investigation.

Because Kiefer paradoxically negates and affirms the symbolic properties of his
imagery and its content, it seems that the artist is primarily concerned with expressing
the poststructural view that the inherent meaning of any concept always implies a
reference to an Other, opposing concept. The fact that these indeterminate images
emphasise the nature of the relationship between two diametrically opposing
meanings and the duality implicit in it, also brought to my attention a related
poststructural notion: that we are only able to make sense of any particular concept
through its relation to an opposing concept. This reference to Other is the condition of
the existence and meaning of all ideas of our reality. My further investigations
suggested that such indeterminate content may allude to the metaphysical.

A re-evaluation of some of Kiefer’s images, focusing on the particular nature of these
intertextual images and its poststructural import, seems to lend support to this
conjecture.

In Heavy Cloud, (cf. Plate 4, pp 23) for example, Kiefer negates phenomenal form by
including an abstract form on the realistic background of a landscape, but in using
lead for the abstract form, the physicality of the abstract symbol is also affirmed. In so
doing Kiefer may be alluding to the fact that the concept of negation cannot be
expressed and cannot serve as a symbol for the metaphysical before it is in fact
affirmed. The negated abstract symbol cannot exist and serve as a vehicle for the
metaphysical except by virtue of a phenomenal physical substance. The notion of a
physical substance that may articulate metaphysical content through negation in itself
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certainly concurs with Urban’s notions of symbolism.  However, in traditional
metaphysical symbols, the difference between the two entities (the signifier and the
signified) is invariably perceived from the perspective of the latter term, the term of
plenitude, from which the latter term of the opposition is held to derive. In other
words, we usually do not pay too much attention to the phenomenal (physical)  origin
and qualities of the image but focus our attention and thoughts on its symbolic
properties - that is, that which is signified.

Contrary to such traditional symbolic principles, Kiefer’s imagery emphasizes the
signifying properties of the image, in this case the lead and texture of the abstract
shape rather than the metaphysical reality it alludes to. The artist makes us aware that
the idea of a divine substance  has its origin in a physical earthly substance. Moreover,
not only are the metaphysical qualities of the image rooted in mundane physical
properties, but the former is dependent on the latter. The concept of negation and the
metaphysical ideas it embodies can be expressed only through a physical image. This
suggests that the negated content is contaminated and impure, making it impossible to
conceive of something that is uniquely metaphysical in its own right.

Derrida’s notion of the arche-trace may also be related to such a simultaneous
conceptual emphasis on both a signifier (the physical properties of an image) and a
signified (negated properties suggestive of the metaphysical), as well as the
inextricable relation between such oppositional terms.

Ultimately then, the image does not merely suggest the negated content which alludes
to the metaphysical, or just the physical properties of the symbol that limits such an
expression, but rather a relationship to Other that provides both the possibility and
impossibility of expressing negated content. As Gasche explains, the metaphysical
‘concept of plenitude or presence can be thought only within dyadic conceptual
structures (1986: 187).
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Kiefer’s use of negation clearly does not express only negation but also alludes to the
possibility and impossibility of the expression of negation, a metaphysical referent.

Kiefer’s use of anthropomorphism reflects the same logic of the arche-trace, and may
be demonstrated  with reference to Nigredo (cf. Plate 10, pp 40). In this image, Kiefer
alludes to the idea that the value and goodness of the metaphysical is tainted with evil
and destruction. By emphasising this reciprocal contamination of the valuable and the
valueless, the self and the Other, the image alludes to an important poststructural
concept : that these are not mutually exclusive concepts, but that the one is dependent
on the other. Rather than referring to specific ideas, the image invites the viewer to
consider the particular relationship between these opposing ideas : that a revelation of
that which is good and valuable is attainable and possible only by way of a detour
through its opposite, death and destruction. This relation to an Other does not describe
things that exist in language, such as goodness and evil, but a necessary structure of
relation between such concepts. It alludes to something that precedes language. It
represents the condition of the possibility of the existence of differing concepts such
as goodness and evil, and their inherent meanings, through the establishment of a
interrelationship between them. The image thus indirectly alludes to that which makes
it possible for us to conceive of such notions as goodness and evil, that we may
attribute to the metaphysical.

Kiefer’s use of generalization seems to follow much the same pattern. In Birth of the
Sun (cf. Plate 13, 14, 15 and 16, pp.49 - 50), the artist makes use of intertextual
images that allude to varying interpretations of the notion of the absolute. Because
these images all directly point to differing conceptions of a unified metaphysical
whole, they inhibit the viewer from grasping the notion of an all-encompassing
metaphysical unity.  Even so, these disparate intertextual elements also indirectly hint
at an underlying absolute, a common force shared between the images. It is this act of
referring to an Other (another underlying notion of the absolute) that restores the
inherent meaning of these various themes of the absolute. It repeats their meaning as
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an integrated idea. This reference to Other may be said to constitute a self-reflective
doubling: it makes it possible for these various themes to appear to themselves as
themselves, as a repeated reflection of themselves that signifies the idea of an
undivided whole.

Yet this very reference to Other also makes it impossible for these varied themes to
express the idea of a unitary absolute. In order for these images to refer to another
underlying notion of the absolute, they have to sacrifice their own meanings. They
must admit, so to speak, to the failure of their own meanings and values so that they
can assume a function of reference, so that they may refer to an Other. Consequently,
the images refer to a notion of an absolute that does not coincide with its own
meaning, but to an Other meaning from which it is absent. The act of re-representing
the notion of an absolute suggests that it is not a self-identical whole, but is
incomplete because, ‘it is inscribed in the space of repetition and splitting or doubling
of the self’ (Gasche 1986: 291).

Rather than articulating specific ideas, such as the notion of an absolute unity, the
image refers to a relationship between the images and what they signify: a relationship
between a self and an Other that makes it possible to express the notion of a self-
identical absolute and also simultaneously limits and denies such a expression.

My work may also be said to allude to similar poststructural principles. One work in
which I attempted to deconstruct the notion of a universal concept is Seat of the Soul
(cf. Plate 17 and 18, pp. 54). In this work, the viewer is presented with a reflection of
his eye that re- represents the self as an Other - as an exteriorized double. I intended
this to allude to a certain duality inherent in the notion of the self that would not
permit the viewer to see himself as an integrated whole. I also wanted to convey the
idea that an understanding of the self as a unique internal locus of one’s essence is
dependent on a relation to the external phenomenal world (an outside).
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I hoped that in emphasizing such a relation between the self and Other the work might
encourage the viewer to consider the fact that this very relation must precede both the
existence of the self as self, and of the self as Other (as reflection). Without such a
relation, no appearance of the presence of the self can come into being. In spite of the
traditional esoteric connotations of the work, I hoped that it might evoke not the
specific idea of a self, but rather a structural relationship that makes it possible to
conceive of a self in the first place. I also intended to evoke the idea that it is
impossible for the self to be a specific localizable singularity that exists apart from the
outside world.

In the final analysis, Kiefer’s and my own intertextual imagery does not express
negated, anthropomorphic or generalized concepts as such, but rather that which
makes it possible for these concepts to allude to the metaphysical, and also makes it
impossible for these concepts to delineate the metaphysical definitively.

Given the fact that these images do not allude to specific ideas but rather structural
relationships between concepts, the question arises whether these intertextual images
may still be regarded as metaphors. After all, Urban conceives of metaphors as
vehicles for the expression of definitive metaphysical concepts. In contrast, Kiefer’s
and my own images, even though alluding to the notions of negation,
anthropomorphism and generalization, do not articulate these notions or any
metaphysical ideas they may engender definitively, and therefore are inconsistent with
Urban’s notions of metaphor. In fact, such indeterminate employment of these
concepts that both express the metaphysical and resist such an expression seems to be
a closer approximation of Derrida’s notion of metaphoricity. It is a concept that
Derrida describes as a structural relationship that alludes to the possibility, as well as
the impossibility, of the metaphoric expression of the metaphysical.

In Heavy Cloud, for example, this peculiar use of metaphor may be seen. In this
image Kiefer uses a form that is negated and generalized in order to express a
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metaphysical concept  (the notion of a divine emanation). Initially the employment of
a negated and generalized signifier which alludes to a metaphysical signified seems
consistent with Urban’s theory of metaphors. As is usual with metaphors, the viewer
is led to interpret the image as a signifier that refers to a signified. In guiding the
viewer’s thought processes towards a specific idea, the viewer’s attention is focused
on the inherent meaning of the signified, the metaphysical concept that is alluded to.
(Fig 5. a).

However, Kiefer’s intertextual approach to imaging not only emphasizes that which is
expressed, (the signified) but also emphasizes the signifier itself. This results from the
fact that the signifier is made up of lead, which emphasizes the physical properties of
the abstract shape, rather than its symbolic content. This invites the viewer to interpret
the image less as a symbol of the divine, and more as a sign for a mere physical
substance. In  so doing, the viewer’s usual conceptual reading of this metaphoric
image is reversed, because in this instance, the non-symbolic element maintains the
viewer’s focus of attention. (Fig 5. b)
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This reversal, culminating in an awareness of the physical nature of the metaphor may
also allude to the inherent relationship between the signifier and signified. It is
suggested that it is in fact the physical nature of the signifier that makes it possible to
conceive of a signified, an idea of the divine. Without the phenomenal we would not
be able to express metaphysical concepts at all. In a sense, the signified (Divine) is
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dependent for its existence on the phenomenal signifier. This presents a point of
contention, because it invalidates the belief that metaphors can uncover the
metaphysical, as something that exists separately from our reality and that transcends
it. It would seem that the very nature of the metaphoric process makes the concept of
the metaphysical dependent on the physical. It makes it subservient to the physical,
contradicting the very essence of our beliefs and intuitions about the uniqueness and
transcendence of a metaphysical reality.

By alluding to the relation between signifier and signified, rather than metaphoric
content itself, the image makes us aware that our metaphysical concepts can only exist
insofar as they are related to an Other (phenomenal entity). Because of this, it is
impossible to express that which is truly metaphysical in its own right. It suggests that
we can never fully understand the metaphysical because we cannot see it for itself, but
can only conceive of contaminated metaphysical ideas  that’ hint at the logic of
contamination and of the contamination of the logical distinction between concept
and figure’ (Gasche 1986: 310). In support of this line of thought, Gasche maintains
that the analogies which enable the expression of the metaphysical also cover up such
content. ‘Indeed since the ‘as’ structure [of metaphor]  uncovers with regard to an
Other, it veils and reveals in the same gesture’ (1986: 301). Rather than expressing
metaphoric content, the image alludes to the possibility and impossibility of the
expression of the metaphysical content, it alludes to the notion of metaphoricity.

It expresses ‘that ... which itself is not analogical, since it forms the ground of analogy
[something]  outside of the system [of signifiers and signifieds]’ (Gashe 1986: 304),
that which enables an image to enter into an analogical relationship with an abstract
concept, so that  metaphysical truth may be expressed. As Gasche states, it is that
which ‘allows a concept to be a idealised counterpart of a sensible image’ (1986:
308) and therefore it is  ‘older than the philosophical distinction between the proper
and the metaphoric’ (1986: 294).
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The common factor in both my own and Kiefer’s intertextual images is that they do
not articulate specific concepts, but rather a structural relationship between differing
concepts, specifically between elements that are diametrically opposed to one another.
This relation to an Other, which alludes to the possibility and impossibility of the
existence of specific and definitive ideas, is reflected in all the various poststructural
concepts that have been mentioned up to this point. These concepts, such as
différance, the arche-trace, the supplement  and metaphoricity are collectively referred
to as infrastructures, and have this in common: they constitute ‘the open matrix in
which these oppositions and contradictions are engendered’ (Gasche 1986: 147).

Because these infrastructures explain how our ideas and concepts come to exist
through a relationship between oppositional terms, they point to a place outside of
such dialectical opposites and the meanings they engender, something that does not
form part of our language. As Gasche maintains, these infrastructures cannot be a part
‘of the opposites for which they account for otherwise it would belong to the order of
what it comes to explain’ (1986: 148). Infrastructures are older than these concepts
and language in general and also precede the logic that gave rise to them. To think
infrastructures is to think pre-logically, as that which makes possible the logical and
thus thought itself.  It is that which governs the possibility and impossibility of every
logical proposition. Therefore ‘no constituted logic nor any rule of a logical order
can...provide a decision or impose its norms upon these pre-logical possibilities’
(Gasche 1986: 249).

In this sense, infrastructures are metaphysical or transcendental structural principles
insofar as they precede and exceed the realm of our knowledge and our ideas,
including our notions of the metaphysical. Because infrastructures allude to something
that precedes even our metaphysical concepts such as God, it is actually more
metaphysical than any traditionally held metaphysical concept or deity.  ‘It comprises
properties that are by right older than those traditionally attributed to the
transcendental’ (Gasche 1986: 295).
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At first it may seem that the concept of infrastructures alludes to more fundamental
metaphysical concepts and existents. This, however, is impossible for a number of
reasons. Firstly, infrastructures represent both the possibilities and impossibilities of
the existence of concepts or existents, meaning that they allude to both the truth and
falsity of the existence of entities such as God. Secondly, because infrastructures
precede logic and illogical thought, they cannot provide definitive and intelligible
ideas about metaphysical entities. In short, they make it impossible to definitively
name, characterize or believe in any specific concept or entity. Thirdly, because
infrastructures cannot be regarded as definite existing things in themselves as
traditional metaphysical concepts presuppose, they are not  ‘essences, since it is not
dependent on any category of  [language such as]  that which is present or absent. Nor
is it a supra essentially beyond the finite categories of essence and existence. It does
not call any higher inconceivable or ineffable mode of being its own’ (Gasche 1986:
149). To think that which the infrastructures designate is to think that which cannot
directly be thought of, that which is beyond human understanding and meaning
because it cannot be embodied in language, in short, that which is unnameable.

Ultimately, then, the content of Kiefer’s intertextual images does allude to the
metaphysical, but as that which cannot be defined in the context of human language.

Such a view of the metaphysical is inconsistent with Urban’s theories of metaphysical
symbolism. Rather than alluding to specific, generalized, negated and
anthropomorphic ideas, intertextual images render such notions indeterminate. This
view further contradicts the notion of symbolic truth in that it does not allude to
intelligible ideas that may define the nature of an ultimate reality, hinting rather at
something that cannot be understood as meaningful. Because intertextual images do
not suggest a metaphoric relation between a sign and a signified, but rather that which
precedes the linguistic paradigm of such a relation, they do not facilitate an intuitive
grasp of metaphysical truth. 
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Intertextual images may be said to allude to something that escapes the structure of
opposition between an image and abstract ideas, the symbolic and the literal. We are
unable to derive any definitive knowledge of the metaphysical from these images,
because they guide our thoughts to a place outside of the oppositions that inform our
language and our understanding of reality.   

In accordance with infrastructural principles, the content of intertextual images may
be said to allude to a disappearance of meaning, something that appears to us as a
perpetual withdrawal from our understanding and intuition. In trying to grasp or think
that which is alluded to in these images, our conceptions disappear and dissolve,
simply because we cannot think or understand that which precedes thinking and
understanding. As Gasche points out, ‘to think outside of ontological difference
eventually condemns one to be no longer able to think at all or to engage in
something that can no longer be called thinking...’(1995: 170).
 
Therefore,  the content of these images cannot be the object of even the most refined
form of the intuiting of essences. They escape phenomenalization to the extent that
they refuse to appear in person or present themselves to the phenomenological gaze.
According to Gasche, ‘the infrastructures dissolve the comprehension of the thing in
itself. Instead of offering themselves up they withdraw. They efface themselves,
constantly disappearing as they go along’ (1986: 150).

However, this does not mean that intertextual images allude to a mere absence, but
rather to a sense of something that appears to disappear, or as Derrida puts it, ‘a
something without thing’ (1993: 80). This vague sense of metaphysical presence
results from the fact that  infrastructures not only represent something outside of
language, but also that which makes possible the existence of ideas and concepts
(language). In expressing these notions, intertextual images therefore not only allude
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to something that transcends language and reality, but also the birth of language and
meaning.

Because of this, intertextual images will always allude to notions of the metaphysical
that  ‘go both ways [that]  are divided in two and lend themselves to two readings
(Gasche 1986. 191): one of an absence of meaning and one of a presence of meaning,
a sense of something but also of something that continually evades us by
disappearing. Ultimately such a view suggests something that ‘remains at the margin
of the system’ of meaning and existence (Gasche 1986: 191).

When we interpret intertextual images such as those of Kiefer’s, we may still get a
vague sense of a metaphysical element present in these images, which invites us to
delve into the suggested meaning of the work.  But instead of being rewarded with a
definitive insight into a metaphysical reality, the mysterious sense inherent in the
work resists our attempt at interpretation. It keeps on withdrawing from us; the more
we try to get an intuitive grasp on that which is alluded to, the more it withdraws into
silence. Neither simply present nor absent, this unnameable is a ‘site of desertion ...the
no place of a certain withdrawal. Something is always slipping away, always
missing...’ (Taylor 1992: 292).

As Taylor aptly claims with regard to Kiefer’s work, ‘ Beyond history, beyond even
myth, Kiefer pursues or is pursued by something other, that is neither near nor far,
neither immanent or transcendent. Its distance is proximate and its proximity distant.
Never present without being absent, this beyond that is ever near is the unfigurable
that Kiefer struggles to figure’ (1992: 292).

Even though it is clear that the content of intertextual images articulates a very
different view of the metaphysical from symbolism, it does not necessarily mean that
the partly symbolic properties of these images are obsolete. Kiefer’s ardent and
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continued exploration of different symbolic imagery and its concepts throughout his
career attests to this.

Even though I have aimed to express a poststructural view of the metaphysical
through my own exploration of intertextual imagery, I have also continued to make
use of various symbolic images in my work. I have come to realise that the presence
of symbolic elements adds a hermetic and mystical quality to the content of my work
that seems to support and facilitate the expression of something that is unnameable.
At times, it has seemed to me that there may even be a mysterious affinity between
the disparate approaches.

Perhaps such a affinity is not entirely unimaginable if one considers the fact that the
poststructural view of the metaphysical as an unnameable is not a new concept, but
that it is reflected throughout the ideologies of various historical systems of thought:
ideologies that articulate a similar notion of the metaphysical, albeit from a more
symbolic perspective.

The doctrines of Jewish mysticism, such as the Kabbalah, for example, make
reference to the notion of God as unnameable, indescribable. In central Buddhist
philosophy, the notion of the absolute is also equated with the indefinable. The notion
of the Godly as an unapproachable, unnameable force is also referred to in the Bible,
which states the following, ‘...but the Lord said, you cannot see my face, for no one
may see me and live’ (Exo 33: 20). Of course, the notion of the Judeo-Christian God
cannot be equated with the nature of the infrastructures, because He is believed to be a
singular definitive essence, but it serves as a apt example that many religious
ideologies conceive, at least in part, of the metaphysical as an unnameable concept.

As Gasche notes with regard to the unnameable quality of the infrastructures, ‘the
invisibility of the infrastructure...seems to be linked to a powerful motif in classical
philosophy according to which what makes visibility possible must itself be invisible.
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If that source were seen, it would blind the beholder. According to this logic one
cannot face the source of the light, one cannot speak of that which makes speech
possible, because one cannot withstand so powerful a plenitude. As we have seen, for
structural reasons, that which, as the absolute ground, does not belong to the totality
of what it makes possible, cannot possibly offer itself to perception’ (1986: 231).

In the light of these affinities, it would seem that, at heart, these two opposing
approaches may not be so dissimilar after all. If so, it may be argued that intertextual
images simply re-express the already ancient belief in the inaccessibility of the
metaphysical, and therefore, do not contribute in any significant way to the
contemporary representation of metaphysical content.

On closer consideration, however, intertextuality does seem to offer a valid
contribution to the expression of the metaphysical.

The fact remains that the notions of symbolism, as reflected in Urban’s view on the
subject, seem to have deviated from the basic idea, held by various old beliefs, that
the metaphysical is a mysterious and indefinable construct. Perhaps during the course
of history symbolic thought has developed and adapted to allow us to attribute
specific ideas and concepts to a metaphysical reality. These ideas, such as Urban’s
notions of negation, generality and value, allow us to make more sense of a
metaphysical reality because they allude to ultimate truths that are specific and
intelligible ideas: things that can be described and appropriated through language. It is
a view that satisfies our metaphysical desires: the need to believe in a truth that could
once and for all explain and quantify our reality and our existence.

In contrast to this, however, intertextuality renders all these specific concepts that may
become attached to the notion of the metaphysical indeterminate and obsolete. In
alluding to something ‘outside’ of language, it invites us to reconsider the validity of
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such a definitive view of metaphysical truth, and revives the basic belief in the notion
of the unnameable

Through my own practical explorations, I have come to understand the relationship
between symbolism and intertextuality as a process of contradiction, synthesis and
transformation of ideas, but most importantly, as a journey of discovery that may
facilitate a better understanding of the inherent mystery of truth from a contemporary
perspective.
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CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this research, I set out to investigate the contradictory thought
processes that inform the content of Kiefer’s work. I was of the opinion that these
contradictions might prevent the expression of metaphysical content. As it turned out,
however, the contradictions in Kiefer’s work do not inhibit the articulation of
metaphysical content. In fact, it is the very combination of disparate approaches such
as the symbolic and intertextual that facilitates the expression of metaphysical
content.

I discovered that intertextuality transformed the symbolic content of these images,
rendering its specific concepts indeterminate. This intertextual indeterminacy
dismantles the belief that the metaphysical could be defined by specific ideas such as
universality, negation and anthropomorphism. By removing all definitive concepts
about the metaphysical, intertextuality makes it possible to allude to something that
precedes the existence of language, something unnameable. For Derrida this notion of
the unnameable alludes to a secret that ‘cannot be unveiled  [and] remains inviolable
even when one thinks one has revealed it’ (1993: 26). It is something that ‘remains
silent because it remains foreign to speech’ and all forms of discourse (Derrida 1993:
27).

This study has helped clarify how the contemporary stylistic device of intertextuality
may inform the expression of metaphysical content within the framework of current
thought. It has provided me with an invaluable theoretical basis that supported my
own practical explorations of the metaphysical. In attempting to figure something at
the limits of reality, that which exceeds our potential for understanding, I hoped to
free the notion of the metaphysical from the restraints of relative discourse, from
diametrically opposing concepts such as existence and non existence, light and
darkness, good and evil. As Gasche maintains, the metaphysical is not apart of such
definitive ideas, but rather ‘appears, is named within the difference between all and
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nothing, life and death within difference and at bottom difference itself’ (1995: 160).
As I have come to understand it, to express the metaphysical through intertextual
means, is ‘to say God as He is, beyond his images, beyond this idol that being can still
be, beyond what is said, seen of him; to respond to the true name of God (Derrida
1993: 80). For Derrida at least, this name of God is ‘a sort of universal hive of
inviolable secrets, of idioms that are never translatable except as untranslatable
seals’ (1993: 80).

As I see it, this view does not denigrate a belief in the metaphysical. On the contrary it
enables us to conceive of and express metaphysical content that is not limited to
certain definitive ideas. This is a view that does not seek to define or appropriate the
metaphysical, to bring it under human control, the control of language, expecting it to
fit our expectations on our terms. Instead, it guides us back to the roots of much
traditional philosophical and religious thought - the belief in that which is
unnameable. This may help to re-imbue our notions of the metaphysical with a sense
of mystery. 

Because intertextual images allude to a metaphysical truth that cannot be explained or
understood it may seem to undermine the aim of metaphysical discourse. After all,
metaphysics has always been driven by a need to understand ourselves and our reality,
and to find meaningful answers to our questions. It may even be argued that the
intertextual approach is of no consequence, because what is absolutely unknowable is
of no relevance to our lives. We have always been led to believe that truth is
dependent on understanding, meaning and sufficient reason, that only things that can
be sufficiently explained are true.

It seems to me, however, that the search for an ultimate truth that could sufficiently
explain the nature of an ultimate reality represents a contradiction in terms. If we
could embody such a truth in language, if we could understand it completely, it would
no longer be a part of the metaphysical, something that transcends our reality, but just
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another part of our objective reality (our mortal ideas). In a sense, it seems that to try
and definitively circumscribe the metaphysical is to dissolve and dismantle it.

Perhaps an awareness of something that eludes our grasp is an awareness of the
metaphysical itself. It acknowledges the fact that we have reached the limits of our
reality and alludes to something greater than us. It provides the basis for our beliefs in
the spiritual, which give meaning and purpose to our existence and our world. Perhaps
the inherent value of metaphysics lies not in the act of understanding itself, but rather,
in the act of understanding that there is something beyond understanding.  

In a world so full of disparate views and opinions, each and all alleging the certainty
of a truth, it seems to me that we may have reached a spiritual impasse. Perhaps to
contemplate the silence of an unnameable truth may be more rewarding than to lose
oneself in the labyrinth of conflicting opinions of ceaselessly proliferating claims to
truth.

Is it not better to contemplate a silent truth not dependent on the ever-changing
specific opinions reflected by a zeitgeist  than to conform to the truth of the day or to
wait for a better truth that may never come? Perhaps the only truth we can be certain
of is the truth that we can never be certain. Perhaps we should, as Derrida suggests,
save the name, the name of God, a name that is unnameable.

The rest is silence...
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DEFINITION OF TERMS


ANTHROPOMORPHIC

In the context of this research, the concept of anthropomorphism or the
anthropomorphic will be used to define images that may be said to suggest human
qualities. These qualities may be objective representations of the human form or man
made products or they may be represented through the expressive treatment of form
that implies subjective human qualities such as personal emotions or ideas.



DISSEMINATION

A poststructural concept conceived by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida by
which is implied, an unstable, slippage or deferral of meaning from one sign to
another, generating a state of perpetually unfulfilled meaning that exists in the
absence of all signifieds. ‘In Derrida’s conception, one signifier points away to
another signifier, which in turn points to another signifier, and so on ad infinitum.’
(Harland 1987: 136)



INTERTEXTUALITY

A term coined by the feminist Author Julia Kristeva by which is implied an
interchanging and interrelation of meaning between various signifying systems. In the
context of this research, this term will be used with reference to a particular stylistic
characteristic of the imagery employed by contemporary artists, namely the
combination of veristic, abstract and written elements. The application of this term to
any artist’s work is not intended to relate these images or their content to any of
Kristeva’s other theoretical concepts.
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METAPHYSICAL

The term metaphysical has very broad implications and is generally employed as a
referent to the spiritual in general. Although the artists and theorists that will be
investigated during the course of this research may have differing viewpoints on the
nature of the metaphysical, their work and its content will be analysed from the
viewpoint of Urban’s interpretation of the metaphysical. He sees the metaphysical not
necessarily as that which only pertains to the spiritual to the exclusion of everything
else, but rather as a discourse ‘that seeks to discover the general ideas or principles
which are indispensably relevant to the analysis of everything that happens’.  Urban
thus sees metaphysics as applying to all aspects of being, as that which ‘deals with the
ideas applicable to reality as a whole’ (Urban 1939: 632). In the context of this
research then, the notion of the metaphysical is meant to infer that which includes the
phenomenal (the world of sensory perceived objects), the spiritual and the
connections between these levels of reality that may reflect on the notion of reality as
a whole.



METAPHYSICAL SYMBOL

Urban interprets the metaphysical symbol as an image that pertains to the expression
of life in its innermost essence or in its totality. This definition reflects Urbans’s
general description of his notion of the metaphysical, but in addition, includes and
necessitates the involvement of the artists intuitive processes as a part of its
expression.



POSTSTRUCTURALISM

In the context of this research the notion of poststructuralism is meant to refer to
current philosophical theory that uses the notions of language and its categories as a
means to define our concept of reality. Poststructuralists like Derrida for example
further believe that meaning as it is related to the language of the sign is unstable and
ultimately unpredictable so that signs can be said to ‘work creatively, anarchically
and irresponsibly’ (Harland.1987: 124).
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PRE-LOGICAL

Derrida equates the pre-logical with his notion of the infrastructures. For Derrida,
infrastructures are pre-logical because they allude to ‘something’ that precedes logic,
thinking, existence, in short, all linguistic concepts or ideas. As he says,
infrastructures ‘points …to the pre-ontological status of what amounts to a condition
of possibility of sorts…’ (1995:194). It is ‘something inassimilable because it exceeds
the system [of language] on all accounts (1995: 194).  Derrida seems aware of the
contradiction implied by this notion, namely that he is trying to define with language,
something that is supposed to exceed it. As he indicates, the pre-logical nature of the
infrastructures implies to go ‘there where you cannot go, to the impossible…to
paralyze oneself in the in-decision of the non-event.’ (1995:75). Even though other
pertinent philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, argued that no concepts apart from
inchoate bedrock ‘concepts’ are possible outside of language, the notion of the pre-
logical nonetheless plays an important role in Derrida’s thought about the
metaphysical.

In the context of this research Derrida’s notion of the infrastructures and their pre-
logical nature will be accepted as valid propositions. Any philosophical debate that
may pertain to this notion will not form part of this investigation. 
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